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David Bohm, in ​Wholeness and the Implicate Order​—his argument for viewing reality, in the 
light of quantum physics, as an unified whole—devotes an entire chapter to a language 
experiment he calls the rheomode. Employing the Greek root ​rheo​, meaning “to flow,” it aims to 
demonstrate not only that movement remains central to his wholeness theory of reality but also 
that, as Bohm argues, “all movements shade into each other” (47). Consequently, the rheomode 
offers a systematic approach to language that grants primacy to the verb and emphasizes how 
the adjective and noun emanate from it. At the same time, however, this experiment seems 
cursory; in fact, it mostly highlights the limitations of common approaches to language. We view 
the world as divided, as atomized, into seemingly stable objects because our language grants 
primacy to the noun. While quantum theory, for Bohm, reveals the limitations of atomism, our 
common approaches to language bind us to atomistic worldviews. As a humanist, and 
non-physicist, I do not want to interrogate the veracity of Bohm’s claims about quantum theory, 
however. Nor do I want to treat the rheomode as a constant point of comparison for everything 
that follows in this paper. Instead, I want to use Bohm’s experiment with language—an 
experiment that seems both systematic and cursory—as an impetus to address a series of 
questions. First, what would a more sustained attempt at reconceiving language to foreground 
movement, as essential to understanding reality, entail? Second, in what context, or contexts, 
would such an attempt occur? And, finally, how would such an attempt challenge common 
conceptions of ourselves as stable human subjects? 
Modernist poetics, in general, and the poetics of Wallace Stevens, in particular, seem like 
more sustained attempts to reconceive language along these lines. Ezra Pound’s championing of 
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Ernest Fenollosa’s scholarship on the ideographic nature of the Chinese character, and its 
potential to reshape Western poetics, also highlights the primacy of the verb and the importance 
of movement. In fact, Fenollosa and Pound specifically advocate for the use of strong verbs to 
restore some sense of vitality to language. Unsurprisingly, this occurs in the early twentieth 
century where modernist writers must contend with new scientific insights—the importance of 
the wave and wave theory, the breakdown of Newtonian physics at the quantum level—into the 
fundamental aspects of reality. These insights, ultimately, emphasize movement, chance, and 
the blurring of phenomena. Stevens, of course, operates within these discourses—he knew of 
Pound’s modernist poetics, he read A. N. Whitehead on modern science. This seems clear 
especially in “The Man with the Blue Guitar” and “The Auroras of Autumn.” Like Fenollosa and 
Pound before him, and Bohm after him, he values the verb, and he often employs chiasmus to 
articulate how movements, and related phenomena, fold, unfold, and interact with each other. 
In doing so, he ultimately disturbs conceptions of our own bodies. We should not regard 
ourselves so much as nouns but as collections of moving matter, which shade into other matter 
and ultimately dissolve. A poetics of the verb, of chiasmic folding and unfolding, and, ultimately, 
of movement destabilizes the idea of the human subject as a singular entity. We are not 
undisturbed observers. We are defined by and comprised of movement, best represented by 
verbs not nouns, and continuously interacting with the phenomena that surround us. 
Before delving into the specifics of Bohm’s rheomode, it seems worthwhile to present 
first the underlying argument of ​Wholeness and the Implicate Order​ and its attention to 
movement. For Bohm, quantum physics requires us to reconsider atomistic worldviews: “in the 
domains covered by quantum theory and relativity, the notion of atomism leads to confused 
questions, which indicate the need for new forms of insight, as different from atomism as the 
latter is from theories that came before it” (11). Atomism, in other words, when it moves into the 
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“domains” of quantum physics, can no longer elucidate matters. Unhelpful and unactionable, it 
produces “confused questions.” We should not, however, retreat from these domains and 
rehabilitate atomism; instead, we should cast it aside and construct “new forms of insight.” 
Naturally, the findings of quantum physics—specifically the breakdown in the distinctions 
between the observer and the observed and the thought-process and its content—become the 
bases for constructing one of these new forms of insight: 
Thus, one can no longer maintain the division between the observer and observed (which 
is implicit in the atomistic view that regards each of these as separate aggregates of 
atoms). Rather, both observer and observed are merging and interpenetrating aspects of 
one whole reality, which is indivisible and unanalysable. (12) 
We have to deal here with the one-ness of the thinking process and its content, similar in 
key ways to the one-ness of observer and observed; that has been discussed in relativity 
theory and quantum theory. Questions of this nature cannot be met properly while we 
are caught up, consciously or unconsciously, in a mode of thought which attempts to 
analyse itself in terms of a presumed separation between the process of thinking and the 
content of thought that is its product. (23)  
By presenting the false “division between the observer and observed,” Bohm introduces his 
wholeness theory of reality. Contra atomism, and its separation of observer and observed into 
“separate aggregates of atoms,” he argues for a theory of reality where observer and observed 
become “merging and interpenetrating aspects” of a unified whole. “Merging” and 
“interpenetrating,” here, also underscore the importance of movement to this theory more 
generally; aggregates of atoms are not separate and stable but part of the whole and in flux. 
Later, Bohm maps this argument onto his discussion of “the thinking process and its content.” 
We cannot, in light of quantum theory and relativity theory, divide thinking and thought, and 
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atomism cannot address thinking and thought because it views them as two separate aggregates. 
Only a wholeness theory of reality can begin to address the findings of quantum physics and, in 
doing so, discard the “presumed separation” of observer and observed, thinking and thought, 
and, ultimately, phenomena themselves. 
Communicating this theory of reality, however, requires language, and common 
approaches to language contribute to fragmentation via the “subject-verb-object structure of 
sentences” (36).  By separating the subject and the object with the verb, such a structure 
separates and stabilizes the two entities. Moreover, it will always remain antithetical to a theory 
of reality where all phenomena move, merge, and interpenetrate within a unified whole. We 
need to interrogate this common approach to language, Bohm suggests, before we can even 
begin to to consider the details of reality as a unified whole. (“The rheomode — an Experiment 
with Language and Thought,” is the second chapter of ​Wholeness and the Implicate Order​ for a 
reason: it seems difficult to proceed further without exploring the limitations of verbal 
communication.) Therefore, he proposes an experimental structure that values the verb: “Is it 
not possible for the syntax and grammatical form of language to be changed so as to give a basic 
role to the verb rather than to the noun? … for the verb describes action and movements” (37). 
Much like the earlier considerations of the false division between observer and observed, or 
between thinking and thought, became the bases for a new form of insight into reality, this 
consideration of the verb becomes the base for a new approach to language. ​Wholeness and the 
Implicate Order​ assigns the verb the “basic role” because, by describing “action and 
movements,” it seems consistent with Bohm’s initial “overall world view” (37). 
After establishing the primacy of the verb within the rheomode, Bohm systematically 
demonstrates how other parts of speech emanate from it. Consider, for example, his 
transformation of the adjective “relevant” into the verb “re-levate”:  “We then introduce the verb 
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‘re-levate’. This means: ‘To lift a certain content into attention again, for a particular context, as 
indicated by thought and language’” (44). Within the rheomode, “relevant” no longer operates as 
a stable entity that modifies nouns. Instead, this approach to language reveals the verbal base, 
“re-levate,” of this adjective, and it argues that “relevant” actually denotes the lifting of “certain 
content into attention” continuously. Revealing the verbal bases of words, for Bohm, seems like 
the operating principle of the rheomode: “We see, then, that adjectives have been built from the 
verbs as a root form. Nouns can also be constructed in this way, and they will not signify 
separate objects but, rather, ​continuing states​ of activity of the particular form indicated by the 
verbs. Thus, the noun ‘re-velation’ means a ‘continuing state of lifting a given content into 
attention’” (44–45). Neither nouns nor adjectives are stable entities here. Instead, they “have 
been built” from verbal “root” forms. or, put differently, they seem to emerge from verbal bases. 
Nouns, for example, become “continuing states” of their verbal bases: “re-levation,” just like 
“re-levant,” emerges from “re-levate.” Other examples—“ordinate,” “re-ordinate,” “re-ordinant,” 
“re-ordination”—follow the same course, but Bohm’s insistence that nouns, regardless of their 
specific verbal bases, emphasize “a certain aspect of movement in general” remains important. 
Where common approaches to language see nouns as stable entities, the rheomode sees them as 
continuing, but still momentary, states that emerge from verbal bases. The noun, in this context, 
can no longer claim the basic role in language. 
Nowhere does the rheomode’s systematic nature seem clearer than in a block quotation 
of examples used throughout the chapter. Intended as a summary of words used up to that 
point, it highlights both the value assigned to the verb and the overarching logic of the rheomode 
itself: 
Levate, re-levate, re-levant, irre-levant, levation, re-levation, irre-levation. 
Vidate, re-vidate, re-vidant, irre-vidant, vidation, re-vidation, irre-vidation. 
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Di-vidate, re-dividate, re-dividant, irre-dividant, di-vidation, re-dividation, 
irre-dividation. 
Ordinate, re-ordinate, re-ordinant, irre-ordinant, ordination, re-ordination, 
irre-ordination. (50–51) 
Unsurprisingly, each line begins with a verb (“levate,” “vidate,” “di-vidate,” and “ordinate”), 
unencumbered with a prefix like “re,” emphasizing the pure verb’s primary place within this 
approach to language. Bohm follows these with verbs prepended with “re,” suggesting that 
continuous actions—for example, “re-levate” as the “continuous raising of content to 
attention”—remain verbal. Adjectives appear next, assigning the adjective a secondary place 
within the rheomode. Nouns, meanwhile, end each line and, ultimately, are tertiary. Not only 
does this verb-adjective-noun structure depart from the subject-verb-object structure integral to 
common approaches to language, it also demotes the noun as much as possible. This block 
quotations, then, visualizes Bohm’s argument that, in the rheomode, everything flows from 
verbs and nouns are “continuing states of activity” rather than stable entities. Meanwhile, the 
simultaneous presence of the prefixes “re” and “irre” articulate the totality of the rheomode: 
continuous meaning, “re,” and the negation of continuous meaning, “irre,” share the same 
verbal base. Consistent and comprehensive, Bohm’s experiment with language reveals its 
systematic nature over the course of the chapter.  
And yet, though the rheomode seems systematic, it remains cursory. Bohm himself 
highlights this when he wishes “to take a step in what might be an unending experimentation 
with language” (35). Note the scale and humility here: he proposes only “a step” and, 
characterizing the rheomode, argues that it only “might” have the potential to expand into a 
larger “experimentation with language.” Despite its verb-adjective-noun hierarchy and sense of 
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totality, it remains a small action in the larger field of language itself. The ellipsis that closes the 
chapter offers a similar impression: 
More specifically, we see that the mere act of seriously considering such a new mode of 
language and observing how it works can help draw our attention to the way in which 
ordinary language structure puts strong and subtle pressures on us to hold the 
fragmentary worldview. Whether it would be useful to go further, however, and try to 
introduce the rheomode into active usage, it is not possible to say at present, though 
perhaps some such development may eventually be found to be helpful. (60)  
Here, there exists a tension between the expansive potential of the rheomode and the cursory 
presentation of it in ​Wholeness and the Implicate Order​. On one hand, “the mere act” of 
sketching out a language system that values the verb reveals “strong and subtle” ways that 
“ordinary language structure” reinforces the “fragmentary worldview.” On the other hand, the 
usefulness of pushing this approach to language beyond a cursory sketch remains unclear. Bohm 
seems ambivalent, in this passage, and pushes any commitment to the further “development” 
into the future. While the rheomode offers systematic rules for reconceiving language to 
foreground movement, its potential to become an “unending experimentation with language” 
remains, at best, an eventual development. 
Published in 1980, ​Wholeness and the Implicate Order​ echoes many of the same 
concerns with reality and language that modernist poetics addressed much earlier in the 
twentieth century. When Pound published ​The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for 
Poetry​ in 1919, he popularized, obviously, Fenollosa’s controversial scholarship on the nature of 
the Chinese character, which holds that Chinese characters are, essentially, pictorial expressions 
of the concepts they represent. At the same time, however, he promoted, more subtly, 
Fenollosa’s theory of reality and his prescriptions for reconceiving language to concord with it. 
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For Fenollosa, reality does not consist of stable objects; instead, it consists of objects and actions 
that, to borrow Bohm’s phrase, interpenetrate and merge. Language, in turn, must reflect this by 
privileging strong, concrete verbs over weak, intransitive ones—something that Chinese poetry 
does well, but that English (and, more broadly, Western) translations of it do not. Similar to my 
discussion of Bohm, I do not want to interrogate the veracity of Fenollosa’s claims—in this case, 
his claims about the ideographic nature of the written Chinese character. Instead, I want to 
demonstrate that Fenollosa advocates a theory of reality that values movement and argues, via 
Chinese verse and his prescriptions for translating it, for an approach to language that values the 
verb in order to concord with this theory. That Pound championed this scholarship and, a 
decade after Fenollosa’s death, published the incomplete essay only highlights that movement 
and the verb were concerns of a certain strain of modernist poetics. 
“My subject is poetry, not language, yet the roots of poetry are in language,” Fenollosa 
writes, and language, especially for those in the West, often does not concord with a theory of 
reality where objects and actions intermingle and remain in flux (6). To consider poetry, then, 
we must first stop, step back, and consider language itself. For Fenollosa, however, our common 
approach to language operates on unnatural principles: 
A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in nature. Things are only the terminal 
points, or rather the meeting of points, of actions, of cross-sections cut through actions, 
of snapshots. Neither can a pure verb, an abstract motion, be possible in nature. The eye 
sees noun and verb as one: things in motion, motion in things … (10) 
Though we divide nature into clear categories that seem “true” or “pure,” we do so erroneously. 
Nature does not contain “things” that, like nouns, remain stable and separate; instead, “things” 
emerge out of nature. Here, Fenollosa offers multiple, in his view, more accurate ways to 
consider them: “terminal points,” and the meetings “of points, of actions, of cross-sections cut 
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through actions, of snapshots.” By reconceiving “things” as discrete entities (“points”) bound by 
movement (“actions”) and time (“snapshots”), he emphasizes the need to reconceive our notion 
of the noun itself. Yet, Fenollosa, contra the common notion of the noun, does not gravitate to 
the common notion of the verb. Rather, he argues that noun and verb remain intermingled in 
nature as “things in motion, motion in things.” The chiasmus here underscores this argument: 
“things” fold into “motion” only for “motion” to unfold back into “things.” Fenollosa goes even 
further, however, when he claims that “valid scientific thought consists in following as closely as 
may be the actual and entangled lines of forces as they pulse through things” (12). While he 
again argues that objects and actions intermingle, he also grounds his argument in a rhetorical 
idea of science. “Valid” science here becomes the study of his theory of reality where “lines of 
forces … pulse through things,” and this lends his subsequent discussions of language itself a 
seemingly scientific basis.  
If common approaches to language, with their clear but misguided notions of nouns and 
verbs, do not concord with this theory of reality, then we must reconceive these approaches. 
Devaluing the noun, for Fenollosa, seems like a good start. As he exclaims, “Nature herself has 
no grammar. Fancy picking up a man and telling him he is a noun, a dead thing, rather than a 
bundle of functions!” (16). Again, Fenollosa claims that “nature” and language do not have a 
one-to-one correlation—the former has “no grammar.” At the same time, however, the noun 
becomes a “dead thing” that erases the “bundle of functions” that comprise all things, including 
ourselves. It becomes necessary, therefore, to turn away from the noun and towards the verb. 
Even with the earlier acknowledgement that the “pure verb” does not exist in nature, Fenollosa 
still claims that “the verb must be the primary fact of nature, since motion and change are all 
that we can recognise in her” (19). Again, Fenollosa’s theory of reality values 
movement—“motion and change”—and the verb emblematizes that.  
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This theory of reality, ultimately, propels Fenollosa into his discussions of Chinese verse 
and the proper approach for translating it vividly. If the noun represents a “dead thing,” if the 
verb remains “the primary fact of nature,” and if the “ideographic” Chinese character expresses a 
“verbal idea of action,” then we need an approach to language that values the verb (9). 
Fenollosa’s scholarship on Chinese verse, in this respect, operates as a space where he can 
identify the weaknesses of common approaches to language and envision alternatives. Such 
weaknesses include the penchant to generalize, abstract, and reduce verbal actions into states of 
“bare existence”—in other words, “dead” nouns (15). Confronted with Chinese verse, however, 
Fenollosa sees an opportunity to assign language a verbal base that concords with his “motion 
and change” worldview. Therefore, he writes, “in translating Chinese, verse especially, we must 
hold as closely as possible to concrete force of the original, eschewing adjectives, nouns and 
intransitive forms wherever we can, and seeking instead strong and individual verbs” (15–16). 
The hierarchy here seems clear: transitive verbs, “intransitive forms” of verbs, nouns, and 
adjectives. As ​The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry​ progresses, Fenollosa 
increasingly elevates the importance of the verb. Not content simply to devalue the noun and 
adjective, he insists that both retain some occluded, but still present, verbal base. In fact, he 
writes that “the adjective retains a substratum of verbal meaning” and that we ought to “bear in 
mind the verbal undertone of each noun” (19, 28). “Substratum” and “undertone” both suggest a 
verbal ground to language in this passage: before the adjective leaves its mark, the verb does; 
when the noun makes its sound, the verb makes a deeper, underlying one. Even prepositions 
and conjunctions become ostensible verbs: the former because they operate as verbs in a 
“generalised sense,” the latter because they “mediate actions between verbs” (20). For Fenollosa, 
everything returns to the verb. 
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Of course, Fenollosa does not write ​The Written Chinese Character as a Medium​ for 
Poetry, nor does Pound publish it, in a vacuum. Beginning in the nineteenth century, modern 
science destabilized the common conception of phenomena as stable entities. Physicists like 
James Clerk Maxwell, and others working on wave theory, emphasized the essentially vibratory 
nature of all phenomena. Gillian Beer has argued that such scientific arguments, by 
foregrounding the importance of movement in nature, helped create the conditions required for 
literary modernism in the early twentieth century. She writes, for example, that “wave theory, 
acoustics, radiation, all seemed to indicate that our senses are contracted and that we are 
battered by continuous events beyond their registration: sound waves, air waves, the irreversible 
transformations of thermodynamic energy” (296). As observers, our range of observation 
remains limited—we perceive phenomena like sound, air, and energy as stable entities because 
we cannot easily ascertain their continuous, vibratory nature through our own senses. Waves, 
understand in this context, assumed a new importance in what Beer describes “a manifest social 
complex of referents” of the nineteenth century (299). No longer did they only refer to the 
ocean’s movement; they came to represent “any kind of periodic disturbance in a medium or in 
space” as well (299). By emphasizing “periodic disturbance” through the metaphor of constantly 
moving, constantly changing waves, such scientific arguments also established movement as 
integral to understanding nature. Slowly, Beer claims, these arguments made their ways into 
more public discourses. In fact, she quotes Clerk Maxwell’s own wish that wave theory could 
intrigue the “intelligent public” and lead them “in pursuit of the arcana of science to the study of 
the singularities and instabilities, rather than the continuities and stabilities of things” (306). 
Clerk Maxwell, in other words, had no desire to sequester his scientific work. Instead, he hoped 
its “arcana” could shift the public’s focus from “continuities and stabilities” towards the 
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“singularities and instabilities” that more accurately describe nature. By the late nineteenth 
century, Beer claims, literature had begun to interact with such scientific arcana: 
The idea of the universe as waves, of the parallels between light, heat, and sound, and the 
single process expressed through them, enters late-nineteenth-century writing with a 
fresh urgency. Flux, the vortex, the ocean, the aura, the ‘sea of forces flowing and rushing 
together’, as Nietzsche called it, so important in modernism, are all elements of a 
repertoire shifting across fields. (313) 
Consider the language used in the passage: “process,” “flux,” “vortex,” “ocean,” Nietzsche’s “sea 
of forces flowing and rushing together,” and “shifting.” The primary metaphors of late 
nineteenth century writing, in Beer’s view, express continuous movement. If modern science 
presents nature as primarily vibratory, then it seems natural that modern writers, aware of these 
arguments, would seek to develop methods for conveying this. 
This shift, from phenomena as stable to phenomena as vibratory, continues in the early 
twentieth century. Quantum physics, in fact, tends to confirm the importance of movement in 
understanding nature. Whitehead, in ​Science and Modern World​ (published in 1925), finds the 
vibratory essence of phenomena the most helpful way of contending with contemporaneous 
physics: “The path in space is such that a vibratory entity—where the entity is ​constituted​ by 
vibrations—must be represented by a series of detached positions in space, analogously to the 
automobile which is found at successive milestones nowhere in between” (36). While Whitehead 
seems most concerned with “the path in space” of an entity, the repetition here belies his 
concern with the nature of such an entity. After introducing “a vibratory entity,” he stops and 
emphasizes that this term is synonymous with an entity “constituted by vibrations.” Things do 
not merely vibrate but are vibrations. Like the scientific arguments of the nineteenth century 
discussed by Beer, the argument here destabilizes the notion that phenomena are stable. Later, 
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alluding to contemporaneous conversations in quantum physics (specifically, it seems, those 
related to what would become Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle which holds that we can never, 
fully or precisely, locate the position of an electron in space), Whitehead takes his argument 
further: “It seems, therefore, that the hypothesis of essentially vibratory existence is the most 
helpful way of explaining the paradox of discontinuous orbit” (36). To understand the questions 
posed by modern science, we need to commit to the “essentially vibratory existence” of 
phenomena. Early twentieth-century science, in this respect, confirms the nineteenth-century 
shift from the stable to the vibratory that Beer regards as so important to the rise of literary 
modernism. 
The shifts in modern poetics and modern science towards movement as an organizing 
principle, whether in the use of the verb or in our understanding of phenomena, bring this essay 
both to Stevens and to the earlier discussion of Bohm. I do not simply want to compare these 
two writers, however. Instead, I want to use Bohm to frame Stevens, because if Bohm’s 
rheomode represents a cursory, later attempt to reconceive language along verbal lines in order 
to foreground the centrality of movement in reality, then Stevens’s poetics represents a more 
developed, earlier attempt to do exactly this. This attempt unfolds in two distinct ways, both on 
display in “The Man with the Blue Guitar.” First, Stevens values the verb, often beginning lines 
with verbs or carrying them across lines and couplets. In doing so, he suggests both that lines 
can emerge from verbs and that verbs often overflow poetic boundaries. Second, his use of 
chiasmus throughout the poem foregrounds the movement of words themselves. The inverted, 
abba structure of chiasmus how demonstrates words can, to borrow Bohm’s phrase again, 
“interpenetrate and merge” on the page—a moves into b, remains b for a moment, and returns 
as a. Read against the backdrop of Fenollosa’s essay and the findings of nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century physics, Stevens’s poetics indicate an attempt to foreground the centrality of 
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movement in reality. I do not want to suggest that Stevens relied solely on Fenollosa and Pound 
or on quantum physics to develop this poetics, however. Marjorie Perloff, in fact, has highlighted 
the “mutual distrust” between Stevens and Pound (485). And, though Joan Richardson has 
explained how Stevens remained well aware of developments in quantum physics, it would be a 
mistake to reduce “The Man with the Blue Guitar” to his knowledge of Whitehead’s ​Science and 
the Modern World​ (Richardson). Instead, I want to argue that Stevens’s use of the verb and of 
chiasmus emerges from early twentieth-century discourses in both literature and science. His 
use of these techniques, moreover, also carry implications for how we view ourselves as human 
subjects. In sections two and three of “The Auroras of Autumn,” Stevens turns his poetics on the 
body and, thereby, demonstrates that we ought to understand ourselves as verbs, as movements, 
and not as nouns or stable entities. 
From its opening sections, “The Man with the Blue Guitar” highlights the importance of 
the verb to the poem and to Stevens. Section three, for example, begins the majority of its lines 
with infinitive forms of verbs, suggesting that the lines themselves emerge from verbal bases: 
Ah, but to play man number one, 
To drive the dagger in his heart, 
 
To lay his brain upon the board 
And pick the acrid colors out, 
 
To nail his thought across the door, 
Its wings spread wide to rain and snow, 
 
To strike his living hi and ho, 
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To tick it, tock it, tune it true, 
 
To bang it from a savage blue, 
Jangling the metal of the strings . . . (166) 
While verbs assume prominent positions here, nouns recede or even disappear. “To drive the 
dagger in his heart” features only the infinitive “to drive,” the direct object “the dagger,” and the 
indirect object “his heart.” By removing the subject, Stevens devalues the noun and assigns the 
verb a greater role. This treatment continues throughout the section, in lines such as “To lay his 
brain upon the board” and “To nail his thought across the door.” With “To tick it, tock it, tune it 
true,” meanwhile, Stevens intensifies this approach in numerous ways: he presents only verbs 
and direct objects, he alliterates across the entire line, and each four-letter verb lends the line a 
staccato rhythm. And although the elliptical ending line does not feature an infinitive, it still 
begins with a participle. These lines, it seems, emerge from verbal bases; the infinitive forms 
above set them into motion. This formal approach, moreover, articulates one of the themes of 
“The Man with the Blue Guitar”: that “jangling the metal of the [guitar’s] strings” produces 
things as they are. Phenomena, in other words, emerge from vibrations and remain 
vibratory—discourses of modern poetics and modern science become entwined here. 
Stevens also uses imperative forms of verbs to articulate his poetics and his themes 
elsewhere in the poem. The tenth section, for example, contains the following lines: 
Raise reddest columns. Toll a bell 
And clap the hollows full of tin. 
 
Throw papers in the streets, the wills 
Of the dead, majestic in their seals. 
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... 
Roll a drum upon the blue guitar. 
Lean from the steeple. Cry aloud ... (170) 
Like the lines from the third section, quoted in the previous paragraph, these lines foreground 
verbs and dispense with subjects. Unlike those earlier lines, however, these seem more densely 
packed with verbs. “Raise reddest columns. Toll a bell” features two verbs, obviously; slightly 
less obviously, each verb begins a line or sentence, further suggesting how units of language can 
emerge from verbal bases. At the same time, however, Stevens also intensifies each verb. The 
alliteration in “Raise reddest” accomplishes this for “raise,” while the parallel structure of “Toll a 
bell”—“toll” and “bell” as two, four-letter words, beginning with consonants, followed by vowels, 
and ending with “ll”—accomplishes something similar for “toll.” Also, the period between these 
two phrases operates as a caesura and only adds to this intensification. So, not only does Stevens 
value these verbs, he proactively draws attention to them. These imperative forms do not 
disappear after this opening line, however. Instead, Stevens punctuates this passage with them: 
“clap,” “throw,” “roll,” “lean,” and “cry.” And, once again, he connects one of these verbs to “the 
blue guitar” thereby connecting his poetics to one of the thematic concerns of this 
work—language emanates from verbal bases, as phenomena emanate from movement. 
Later sections of “The Man with the Blue Guitar” both continue and refine this use of the 
verb. See, for example, the following lines from section thirty-one: “The employer and employee 
contend, // Combat, compose their droll affair. / The bubbling sun will bubble up, // Spring 
sparkle and the cock-bird shriek” (182). Similar to the examples presented in the previous 
paragraphs, this passage positions verbs at the beginning of lines—“Combat,” “Spring”—to 
suggest how language often emerges from verbal bases. Also similar to the examples in the 
previous paragraph, this passage proactively intensifies these verbs. The caesuric comma that 
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follows “Combat” forces readers to pause over the word, and the alliterative “compose” that 
follows continues to draw attention to what precedes it. “Spring sparkle,” another alliterative 
phrase, produces a similar effect. This passage unfolds in some distinct ways, however. Verbal 
phrases break across lines and couplets, implying that verbs often overflow imposed boundaries 
and continue moving. “The employer and employee” do not just “contend” in one line or couplet; 
they also “combat” and “compose” into the next line and couplet. The “bubbling sun” will not 
simply “bubble up”; it will also “spring sparkle.” Meanwhile, in section thirty-two, Stevens 
revisits his earlier treatment of verbs as bases from which lines emerge when he writes both 
“Throw the lights away” and “Throw away the lights” (183). At the same time, however, he also 
revises his earlier treatment by inverting the order of the words that follow “Throw”—“the lights 
away” become “away the lights.” The same verb, and even the same words that follow it, can lead 
to a multiplicity of lines. While verbs retain their ability to set in motion lines, in these examples, 
they also demonstrate how verbs keep moving, and keep overflowing linguistic and poetic 
boundaries, in Stevens’s work. 
Like Stevens’s use of verbs, his use of chiasmus in “The Man with the Blue Guitar” also 
foregrounds the importance of movement to his poetics. Chiasmus, in this context, does not 
operate only as grammatical figure that features “an inverted relationship between the syntactic 
elements of parallel phrases,” however (“Chiasmus,” Bruhn 187). As Mark Bruhn has 
demonstrated, it operates on much deeper levels throughout Stevens’s poetry. Quoting the Swiss 
critic Max Nänny, Bruhn emphasizes that “the chiastic patterning ​abba​ may occur not just on 
the sentence level but on ​all​ levels of a literary text” (190). With this in mind, he suggests that 
chiasmus operates as an “eidetic” and “visual-spatial” pattern for Stevens (187, 192). While 
Bruhn ultimately argues that such a “pattern of mind” dovetails with those of individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder (those, in other words, sensitive to phenomena and patterns that 
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those without this disorder rarely experience), I want to use this argument as a point of 
departure for examining Stevens’s poetics in light of modern poetics and modern science. If 
chiasmus operates on deeper levels than that of a grammatical figure, and if it represents a 
“visual-spatial” pattern, then it becomes a technique for foregrounding movement through the 
movement of words on the page. Through its abba pattern, Stevens highlights how words fold 
into and then unfold from other, dissimilar words on the page. A folds into b, remains b for a 
moment, and unfolds back into a. Such movement, ultimately, articulates some of the concerns 
of Fenollosa, Pound, and the proponents of modern science: that continuous movement remains 
a “primary fact” of nature. In chiasmus, Stevens finds not only a grammatical figure but a 
“visual-spatial” pattern to articulate his poetics. 
Consider two examples from “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” and how Stevens 
transforms seemingly straightforward instances of chiasmus into visual-spatial structures. One 
such example occurs in the first section: “They said, ‘You have a blue guitar / You do not play 
things as they are.’ // The man replied, ‘Things as they are / Are changed upon the blue guitar’” 
(165). Here, “blue guitar” becomes the “a” component and “things as they are” the “b” 
component of the chiasmic figure. Bruhn might term this example “lexical,” as words alone 
(rather than phonemes or themes, for example) comprise both “a” and “b” components. Though 
this seems straightforward, Stevens divides this example across two couplets and two speakers. 
Not only does this decision draw attention to the presence of the grammatical figure, but it also 
articulates continuous movement across the visual-spatial spread of the page. “Blue guitar” can 
appear at the beginning of one stanza or the end of another; it can appear in one piece of 
dialogue, uttered by one speaker, or in another piece, uttered by another speaker. Similarly, 
“things as they are” can bind two couplets or two pieces of dialogue. By following Bruhn’s lead, 
by thinking of chiasmus in visual-spatial terms, we can see the movement of words on the page. 
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“Blue guitar” folds into “things as they are” only to unfold back into the “blue guitar” across 
poetic and dialogic units. This continuous movement across and through “a” and “b” 
components foregrounds the importance of movement itself in Stevens’s poetics. Indeed, this 
example of chiasmus even accentuates the (similar) thematic concern of these lines: that the 
seemingly stable (“things as they are”) remain unstable and in flux (“are changed upon my blue 
guitar”). Another example, from section six, accomplishes a similar feat: “... The blue guitar // 
Becomes the place of things as they are, / A composing of senses of the guitar” (168). Once 
again, “blue guitar” becomes the “a” component, while “things as they are” and “a composing of 
senses,” as a modifying phrase, become the “b” component (using Bruhn’s terminology, this 
might constitute a mixed lexical/grammatical chiasmus). Like the earlier example, this chiasmic 
construction binds two couplets and suggests continuous movement of components across the 
page. Both examples, therefore, demonstrate that chiasmus operates more as a pattern than as a 
grammatical figure, and that such a pattern remains integral to Stevens’s poetics. 
Even Stevens’s shorter and more punctuated chiasmic constructions underscore the 
importance of movement to his poetics. Section eleven of “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” for 
example, features these lines: “Deeper within the belly’s dark / Of time, time grows upon the 
rock” (171). Here, the chiasmus seems grammatical, with two non-nouns as the “a” component 
and one repeated noun as the “b” component. While this example does not present a 
visual-spatial movement of components across poetic or dialogic units, it still foregrounds 
movement within Stevens’s poetics. More specifically, this chiasmus argues against viewing 
things (that is, nouns) as stable entities. By separating the “b” component, “time,” with a 
caesuric comma, Stevens first suggests that this noun might be more complicated than at first 
glance. Then, by shifting from noun to verb (the non-noun “b” component of this chiasmus), he 
suggests that “time” is not a stable thing but something capable of “growing upon the rock.” This 
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example, in other words, unfolds one of its components into a movement—Stevens combines his 
use of chiasmus with his use of verbs. Later, in section thirteen, the following lines present 
something similar: “Of blue, blue sleek with a hundred chins, / The amorist Adjective aflame . . 
.” (172). Again, two non-nouns, the “a” component, bookend one repeated noun, the “b” 
component. Again, Stevens uses a caesuric comma to separate the two instances of the noun, 
implying that “blue” is not a stable concept. In fact, “blue” can assume various states—it can be 
“sleek with a hundred chins.” While neither of these examples operate on quite the visual-spatial 
level as those in the preceding paragraph, they nevertheless demonstrate how chiasmus can 
operate on multiple levels in “The Man with the Blue Guitar” and still suggest movement. 
Whether through the appearance of components across couplets, lines, or other literary units, or 
through shorter punctuated instances that destabilize nouns, Stevens finds in chiasmus a 
pattern that allows him to articulate that movement remains essential to understanding 
nature—a theme common to both modern poetics (Fenollosa, Pound) and modern science (wave 
theorists, Whitehead, and many others). 
Stevens, at certain points, turns his use of verbs and chiasmus on the body. In doing so, 
he continues to echo the themes of modern poetics and modern science, and he demonstrates 
how interweaving these two discourses can alter our understanding of ourselves as subjects. 
This seems most apparent in “The Auroras of Autumn.” I do not want to argue that this later 
work (published in 1950) transparently mimics Stevens’s verbal and chiasmic techniques in the 
earlier “The Man with the Blue Guitar” (first published in 1936). Instead, I want to suggest that 
Stevens remains preoccupied with the verb and with chiasmus throughout his poetry, even as 
this preoccupation takes different forms in different works. Verbs, in “The Auroras of Autumn,” 
rarely begin or overflow lines or other poetic units. Chiasmic constructions, meanwhile, seem 
subtler and more self-contained than in “The Man with the Blue Guitar.” Yet Stevens still relies 
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heavily on verbs throughout this work, and his use of chiasmus continues. (Bruhn writes, 
correctly I think, that “given the ‘vital’ and accordingly ‘arrogant,’ ‘fatal,’ and ‘dominant’ 
presence of the chiastic ‘X’ in Stevens’ poetry [​CPP​ 257], criticism that neglects the figure 
inevitably does so at its own peril” [Bruhn 200].) This preoccupation, moreover, not only 
highlights the themes of modernist poetics and quantum physics but also turns them on the 
body in destabilizing ways. Sections three and four, in particular, illuminate how Stevens’s 
poetics foreground movement, channel the contemporaneous discourses of modern poetics and 
modern science, and reconceive how we view ourselves as subjects by examining the body. 
“The Auroras of Autumn” begins to touch upon the body, and ultimately the human 
subject, through its portrait of “the mother” in section three. Here, Stevens turns from some of 
the ghostlier images that define the opening two sections (“the serpent” and “form gulping after 
formlessness,” for example) and attends to the body: “Farewell to an idea . . . The mother’s face, 
/ The purpose of the poem, fills the room. / They are together, here, and it is warm” (413). 
Stevens reprises “Farewell to an idea” here from the preceding section, and, though “Farewell” 
remains a noun, it combines a verb and an adjective (or adverb). These lines, in other words, 
begin with a word that has a clear verbal base and connotes journeys or, more generally, 
movement. The subsequent ellipsis leads us to the mother’s “face,” presented as the “purpose of 
the poem.” We can read “face” as a synecdoche in this passage, as one feature that represents the 
mother’s whole body. More importantly, however, Stevens does not regard this face, this feature 
of the body, as a stable entity. Instead, he destabilizes it when he writes that “it fills the 
room”—it moves and is comprised of movement. Unsurprisingly, Stevens uses a short, 
monosyllabic, and active verb (“fills”) to accomplish this (recall “Tick it, tock it, tune it true” 
from “The Man with the Blue Guitar”). Because his poetics already foreground movement via the 
verb, they accentuate this presentation of the body as an entity defined by movement. The 
 22 
following stanza, though it turns away, momentarily, from the “mother’s face,” continues along 
the same lines: “With none of the prescience of oncoming dreams, / It is evening. The house is 
evening, half dissolved. / Only the half they can never possess remains” (413). “Evening” here 
operates on two levels. First, and most obviously, it operates as a noun that denotes the time of 
day. Second, and less obviously, it operates as a participle of “to even.” (This would align with 
Richardson’s reading of “evening” in the title of another Stevens poem, “An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven” [Richardson].)​ ​On this second, and verbal, level, “evening” suggests that neither the 
general “it” nor the particular “house” are stable objects. Instead, they both move and are 
comprised of movement. The following line confirms this sense of destabilized entities in flux. 
The “half dissolved” house, which “they can never possess,” implies that this once seemingly 
solid structure remains ghostlier than previously envisioned. By using verbs to foreground 
movement, then, Stevens primes his readers to understand the body as a “bundle of functions” 
(Fenollosa) or a series of “instabilities” (Clerk Maxwell) but not as a stable entity. 
This section of “The Auroras of Autumn,” however, ultimately returns to the mother and 
to her body. Indeed, Stevens continues, 
Still-starred. It is the mother they possess, 
Who gives transparence to their present peace. 
She makes that gentler that gentle can be. 
 
And yet she too is dissolved, she is destroyed. 
She gives transparence. But she has grown old. 
The necklace is a carving not a kiss.  
 
The soft hands are a motion not a touch. 
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The house will crumble and the books will burn. (413) 
Again, Stevens grounds his presentation of the mother in verbs: she “gives transparence” and 
“makes that gentler that gentle can be,” and her actions and movements define her. Stevens also 
returns to chiasmus in these lines. The phrase “makes that gentler that gentle can be” features a 
mixture of, what Bruhn might call, lexical and grammatical chiasmus: the verbs “makes” and 
“be” become the “a” component here, while the pronoun-adverb and pronoun-adjective pair 
“that gentler” and “that gentle” become the “b” component. By combining these verbal phrases 
and this chiasmic construction, Stevens continues to demonstrate a poetics that values both 
techniques as means to foreground movement. This, in turn, primes Stevens’s readers to grasp 
the import of the following lines where “she too is dissolved, she is destroyed.” The mother 
remains subject to movement as much as movement defines her—she dissolves and grows old, 
though she continues to “give transparence.” Through the “soft hands,” meanwhile, Stevens 
emphasizes that the mother and her body are synonymous here. And, just as “the house will 
crumble and the books will burn,” the mother, as a physical being, will remain in flux, capable of 
dissolution or destruction. 
Section four extends these explorations of the body, while demonstrating many of the 
same verbal and chiasmic techniques, through the foil of the father. Where the mother might 
seem passive, the father seems far more active, yet he also remains comprised of and subject to 
movement. Consider, for example, the opening stanza: “Farewell to an idea . . . The cancellings, 
/ The negations are never final. The father sits / In space, where he sits, of bleak regard” (414). 
Similar to the opening stanza of the previous section, Stevens reprises “Farewell to an idea” and 
eventually uses a short, monosyllabic, active verb (“sits”), twice in this instance, to present “the 
father.” The stanzas that follow, meanwhile, adopt similar approaches: 
As one that is strong in the bushes of his eyes. 
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He says no to no and yes to yes. He says yes 
To no; and in saying yes he says farewell. 
 
He measures the velocities of change. 
He leaps from heaven to heaven more rapidly 
Than bad angels leap from heaven to hell in flames. 
 
But now he sits in quiet and green-a-day. 
He assumes the great speeds of space and flutters them 
From cloud to cloudless, cloudless to keen clear (413) 
Though this passage first describes the father adjectivally (“strong in the bushes of the eye”), it 
soon shifts back to short, monosyllabic, active verbs. Indeed, he “says” numerous times over the 
two lines; his “yeses” and “nos” are themselves short monosyllables, further intensifying the 
verbs here. While Stevens might regard the father as a pastiche of action, he nevertheless defines 
him through verbs. One of these lines, meanwhile, contains a subtle chiasmic construction: “He 
says [a] no to no [b] and yes to yes [b]. He says [a] …” The verbal and chiasmic techniques, then, 
that foreground movement in Stevens’s poetics present themselves here. In fact, they continue 
throughout these lines: the father “measures,” “leaps,” “sits” (again), “assumes,” and “flutters,” 
and “to [a] cloudless [b], cloudless [b] to [a]” demonstrates Stevens’s persistent use of chiasmus. 
And, as in the earlier presentation of the mother, these techniques suggest that the human 
subject remains defined by and comprised of movement. 
This becomes clearer in the closing stanzas of section four, when Stevens examines the 
father’s physicality. Consider, for example, the following lines: “In flights of eye and ear, the 
highest eye, / And the lowest ear, the deep ear that discerns, / At evening, things that attend to it 
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until it hears” (413). We can read “eye” and “ear” synecdochally here, like the mother’s face that 
“fills the room,” and these parts of the father still articulate how his whole remains defined by 
and comprised of movement. “Flights of eye and ear,” in fact, establishes the importance of 
movement to both, as does “the highest eye” and “the lowest ear” which suggest that both parts 
of the body operate across an expansive range. Meanwhile, though, Stevens defines both eye and 
ear via verbs, once again underscoring their importance within his poetics: the ear “discerns” 
and “hears”; later, he writes that the “eye defines” (414). “At evening,” moreover, reprises the 
earlier play on “evening” in section three where it reads both as a noun denoting the time of day 
and, less obviously, as a participle of the verb “to even.” Even as Stevens uses eye and ear as 
synecdoches for the father, he continues to use the same verbal techniques he uses elsewhere to 
foreground movement in his poetics. These techniques, moreover, when turned on the body, 
present the subject more as a “bundle of functions” or a series of “instabilities” than as a stable 
entity. One stanza in this section, in particular, confirms this: “Master O master seated by the 
fire / And yet in space and motionless and yet / Of motion … ” (414). Though “master,” “seated,” 
and “motionless” might present the father as some singular entity, fixed “in space,” they become 
ironic descriptions for a figure “of motion.” 
Reading Stevens’s verbs and chiasmic constructions alongside Bohm’s rheomode does 
not offer us a point of comparison as much as it offers us a point of departure. If Bohm’s 
experiment attempts to reconceive language to foreground movement, and if it remains both 
systematic and cursory, then it encourages us to explore other attempts to reconceive language 
to accomplish this goal. Here, Stevens, at least in “The Man with the Blue Guitar” and “The 
Auroras of Autumn,” enters, but he does not enter into a vacuum. Fenollosa and Pound were 
already exploring (maybe deliberately misreading, in Pound’s case) the Chinese written 
character and Chinese poetry as means towards understanding how the verb operates as “the 
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primary fact of nature.” Meanwhile, nineteenth-century wave theory first suggested that 
vibrations and instabilities best describe phenomena, and early twentieth-century quantum 
physics committed itself to exploring “essentially vibratory existence.” So, Stevens’s poetics and 
its emphasis on movement has its precursors and contemporaries in both modernist poetics and 
modern science. Yet, Stevens’s poetics, when turned on the body, challenges common 
conceptions of the human subject as a stable entity. If verbs define us, if chiasmus emphasizes 
continuous threads of movement and folding and unfolding of phenomena, then how do we 
approach ourselves as subjects? In ​Modes of Thought​, Whitehead follows the path of a single 
molecule, as it leaves and enters the body, to redefine “our bodies” more broadly as “region[s] of 
the world” (30). Given the countless molecules with which we interact, and given the limitations 
of our senses to apprehend these entities, the idea of the body as a singular, stable entity 
becomes untenable. Whitehead, in this thought experiment, clarifies that and pushes us to 
reconsider ourselves as subjects. Stevens, via his poetics, seems to accomplish something 
similar. Through verbs, through chiasmus, and by implicitly channeling earlier and 
contemporaneous discourses in poetry and science, he examines the body and finds the human 
subject best described as one comprised of and subject to movement. 
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